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Bruce, Lee, and the Goose

December 17, 2002 - Craig B

Tangotiger:

Since a typical starter has a Leverage Index around 1.00 or so, and a closer can be up around 1.90, what is the figure for a typical long reliever? I would imagine it must be quite a bit lower than 1.00...

Maybe a season like Mark Eichhorn, 1986, where he threw 157 innings in relief and would have won the ERA title if he had five more. I'm betting his leverage index was well below 1.00.

Tippett and DIPS (August 1, 2003)

Posted 10:46 p.m., August 1, 2003 (#27) - Craig B
  Like Tom Tippett isn't busy enough putting together the greatest baseball game of all time. Crack, go home.

Jim, Robert Dudek has been doing some work on park factors; he told me about some of it at the Rays/Jays game on Thursday. One of the interesting things he has found is how high the correlation is year-to-year for 2B/3B rates by park. You would, therefore, expect higher correlation of pitchers' year-to-year 2B/3B rates regardless, because the ballparks are quite stable with respect to 2B/3B rates and less so with regard to singles.

It's going to be important, in doing studies like this, to park-adjust the numbers.

Fanhome's Dackle: World Series Odds (September 18, 2003)

Posted 12:14 p.m., September 18, 2003 (#9) - Craig B
  Man, I like the Sox better than 7.8%, but not 6-1! Now at 12-1, I think I'd bet on that.

I'm tempted to drop a C-note on Atlanta at 6-1 though. I bet if you looked hard enough, you could find them at marginally higher odds. At 13-2 or 7-1, that's a nice potential payoff.

Odds of Cubs losing an 11-run lead (October 11, 2003)

Posted 4:38 p.m., October 15, 2003 (#19) - Craig B
  Was the Marlins scoring 11 runs any less likely than the Cubs taking an 11 run lead to begin with?

Since we are talking about a situation where the Cubs already had an 11 run lead, yes. About 100% less likely.

It was perfectly reasonable for him not to take any chances on it happening again in the playoffs.

No, it was not perfectly reasonable. It was perfectly unreasonable for him to leave a young pitcher who had already been worked hard in the playoffs, and who has pitched much more than he ever has before in a year this year, to pitch two utterly meaningless innings when it would have left him fresh for a Game 6.

In the end, Prior tired badly at the end of Game 6, started leaving pitches up, and gave up five runs (with the help of some bad luck), leaving him and the Cubs with the loss.

Odds of Cubs losing an 11-run lead (October 11, 2003)

Posted 12:11 p.m., October 16, 2003 (#22) - Craig B
  RossCW, the next time you talk to a pitcher, I suggest you ask him. Just ask him about the difference between throwing 85 or so and throwing 120.

Some guys love it. There is a class of pitchers who thrive on the workload, and in particular guys who like short rest and heavy workloads, because it keeps them sharp. Roy Halladay is one who likes longer outings when he can, and prefers short rest (never five days) because he feels sharper and more in control.

Breaking pitches in particular are notoriously affected by the wrong amount of time off or feeling tired - something I remember well from when I pitched myself in youth baseball. At the end of a session, one loses velocity but even more, loses the ability to make a good mechanical delivery. That affects the breaking pitches much more because the release point is even more crucial there.

Other guys, I think more of them, like the extra rest, and would (all other things being equal) prefer to throw 100 pitches or less in a start, or take an extra day, what have you, so that their arm is better rested, and throw side sessions at 50% or 75% to keep themselves sharp.

Prior, in his last few batters of Game 6, looked like a tired pitcher. His breaking pitches were all up, the sure sign of a lazy arm slot, and his velocity was down, the sure sign of tired legs. He was leaving the ball in the hitting zones and the Marlins were hitting rockets off him (anecdotally... I'd have to go back to the game summary to refresh my memory exactly).

Was that caused by the extra work at the end of Game 2? We'll never know... the supposed cause isn't proximate enough for us to judge. Maybe he was too excited and couldn't sleep well the night before, affecting his recovery time. Maybe he couldn't get properly loose on a cool night (a frequent culprit of short outings).

But heavy workload in a previous start, both anecdotally (for certain) and in some preliminary study (I *think*... I can't recall though so I may be wrong) is certainly a frequent cause of early breakdown the next time out. Managers and coaches will tell you that if you've been worked hard the last time out, most pitchers won't respond as well in their next start.

It's anecdotal, sure, and we don't know how Prior is affected by tough workloads (he sure as heck did fine with them this year, he had a very good September when he was being given a crushing workload by Dusty Baker). But I do know this... when Prior threw 106 pitches or less in a start this year, he was simply awesome in his subsequent starts. Only once in those eight starts did he give up more than one earned run.

Anatomy of a Collapse (October 15, 2003)

Posted 4:29 p.m., October 15, 2003 (#7) - Craig B
  One play in particular that drew criticism...

On the Conine SF, Sammy Sosa tried to throw home for some reason (he had zero chance to get a tag at home unless Cabrera falls down) instead of throwing the ball into 2nd to keep Lowell at 1st.

If he does that, the WE is .243 instead of .237, so -.006 of the Conine play should go to Sosa alone.

Anatomy of a Collapse (October 15, 2003)

Posted 5:17 p.m., October 15, 2003 (#18) - Craig B
  Hmm. I've gotta think that the fan's WARP is about -.031 as well.

(Tongue into cheek)

The replacement level fan is the guy who doesn't go to the game, I would think. You could consider that fan as pocketing the $30 for the game ticket and otherwise having no effect.

Average MLB payroll is about $55 million on revenues about twice that, and the average 81-81 team is about 30-32 wins above "replacement team" with a payroll of about $8 million for 25 guys + the DL. Call it 32 wins and $48 million, or about $1.5 million per marginal win. Now the fan's contribution is $30, of which half ($15) goes to player salaries. So the Wins Above Average of the replacement fan, courtesy of the $15 he takes out of the team's budget, is about $15/$1.5 million or -.00001 wins above average.

This fan was at the game, but was also -.031 wins above average for the play at the railing. So his Wins Above Replacement Fan was -.03099, I think. :)

Futility Infielder - 2003 DIPS (January 27, 2004)

Posted 11:03 a.m., January 30, 2004 (#34) - Craig B
  RossCW, I'm not sure what "work" you're referring to. The work does not need to be duplicated. The results should be duplicated.

If you would RTFA, you'd see that Jay Jaffe actually does replicate one of Voros's most important results. I'll quote Jay's piece for you.

I will point out one more thing. In McCracken's original work (DIPS 1.x), he published data showing how various rates (strikeout, walk, HR, BABIP) correlated from one year to the next, and he also did so showing how the dERA correlated better with the following season's ERA than the previous season's ERA did. To the best of my knowledge, he did not publish the same correlation data for DIPS 2.0. But I have taken the two years of DIPS 2.0 that I have produced and found correlations that are fairly consistent with his findings:

DIPS 1.x DIPS 2.0
Years 98-99 02-03
Baseline IP 162 162 100
Number of P 60 56 96
$BB .681 .673 .733
$SO .792 .801 .824
$HR .505 .372 .272
$H .153 .106 .132

Years 93-99 02-03
Baseline IP 100 162 100
Number of P 503 56 96
ERA to next ERA .407 .288 .378
dERA to next ERA .521 .513 .524

The baseline IP is the number of innings pitched in both seasons a pitcher needed to qualify for the study. McCracken used separate baselines for the two comparisons, but since I had data for both 100- and 162-inning levels, I'm running it here.

The numbers in the last two lines are the most important single result in sabermetrics over the last five years.

Futility Infielder - 2003 DIPS (January 27, 2004)

Posted 2:42 p.m., February 5, 2004 (#45) - Craig B
  Jay - the original result was the important one... yours was a nice confirmation though.

RossCW - You have a serious reading comperhension problem. Please see a specialist, or a f***ing fourth-grade teacher. I said it replicates Voros's results. With a different data set, yes. The results (you know, the findings?) are replicated

I see the point about redoing Voros's study, the idea that he may have screwed up his study. If he did, then it's odd that everyone since has reported similar results. But of course you will never be satisfied.

Forecasting Pitchers - Adjacent Seasons (January 30, 2004)

Posted 11:18 a.m., January 30, 2004 (#1) - Craig B
  Wow, great stuff, Tango! I'm building a projection system as we speak :)

Baseball players sensing things are what they should be (February 2, 2004)

Posted 11:54 a.m., February 3, 2004 (#3) - Craig B
  I wouldn't want to insure player contracts. Such an expense, in my view, is throwing good money after bad.

The genius of Paul DePodesta (February 4, 2004)

Posted 2:45 p.m., February 4, 2004 (#1) - Craig B
  That's terrific.

The genius of Paul DePodesta (February 4, 2004)

Posted 12:11 p.m., February 5, 2004 (#10) - Craig B
  DePodesta denigrates scouts in his piece and, I suspect, any traditionalists who read this article (if they would indeed read it) are likely to be turned off.

No kidding. That's the point. DePodesta doesn't give a flying f**k about what "the traditionalists" think. He, and the Oakland A's, can't afford to.

In fact, a central part of DePodesta's whole point is that what a "traditionalist" thinks of what you are doing doesn't matter in the slightest, unless they are actually part of the organziation you are trying to change. If you are aggressively re-engineering processes, then every concession you make to a "traditionalist" is a step in the wrong direction.

If they are, then you need to co-opt them, plain and simple. You can't change an organization overnight, but you make changes gradually and leverage your successes.

The problem isn't that the process of scouting is flawed

It is. It always has been. It's not completely broken, but it's badly flawed, a theme that Lewis (via his discussions with and about Beane) hammers again and again in Moneyball. Read Dollar Sign On The Muscle if you don't believe me. Scouting has in the past fetishized "The Good Face" to the point that subjective and non-baseball criteria have overwhelmed baseball criteria as the starting point for scouting analysis. That is stupid, and the reason nothing was ever done about it was - if you ask me - because baseball has had a lousy corporate culture as a result of being treated like a plaything by its owners.

such an approach is as likely to meet resistance as have the performance-oriented standards

If your scouts don't like it, let them leave. Make them leave. You think there is something special about scouts? There are hundreds of guys who post to Primer alone who would make fine scouts. Scouts are the dime-a-dozen guys. No organization worth its salt gives a rat's ass about what the replaceable employees think - and your average scout is as replaceable as a guy on the grounds crew. Sure, your cross-checkers have valuable experience, just like the head groundskeeper. You want to try to keep a guy like that happy. But if scouts are resisting necessary changes to process, they're in the way and should be brushed aside.

There's nothing in the DePodesta attitude to the place of scouts that is inherently problematic. New scouts, or adaptable ones, should be able to handle it just fine. There are those who will resist it, because they have been infected with a sick corporate culture. The only solution is to throw those guys out on their ass.

The genius of Paul DePodesta (February 4, 2004)

Posted 2:27 p.m., February 5, 2004 (#12) - Craig B
  why would an owner believe a guy named Tangotiger of all things that there's 10 million$ of inefficiencies that can be tapped?

Because he's a smart guy who understands business and knows that inefficiencies are everywhere. That's what John Henry did in Boston - stopped buying the line that you have to do it a certain way "because it's baseball".

It can be done. It won't always be done, but it certainly can be done.

DePodesta's real point is that it's not enough to have a smart guy like Tangotiger crunching data for you. What needs change is not the details of player acquisition, but the whole operation and the way it does business...

Batter's Box Analysis (February 5, 2004)

Posted 2:34 p.m., February 5, 2004 (#6) - Craig B
  Robert's insight there, and I think it's a valid one, is that 90% of triples are doubles to right by a fast guy, or else are misplayed doubles. It doesn't have anything to do with actual power hitting.

Aaron's Baseball Blog - Basketball (February 9, 2004)

Posted 1:57 p.m., February 9, 2004 (#8) - Craig B
  Incidentally, I've been doing basketball work over the last couple of weeks. Aaron is going to run a piece I did on the top MVP candidates sometime soon (maybe tomorrow) in which I introduce a new Wins Above Replacement metric.

I also have some new work on defense, including two new defensive metrics, up on Batter's Box. Craig Names His NBA All-Defensive Team For Some Reason.

Anyway, Points per Shot Attempt.

According to John Hollinger, the proper denominator to use is FGA + (0.44*FTA). Since there are 0.44 possessions lost per free throw.

That doesn't seem quite right to me... 0.44 possessions, but not 0.44 shots. However, I use it, but for scratchpad calculations you'd be just as good, if not better, using 0.5*FTA.

I sent the following e-mail to Aaron...

Aaron, nice piece on adjusted FG%.

Now I have another stat that will blow your freakin' MIND. Points per shot attempt, or PSA, which is another stat from the prodigious basketball brain of John Hollinger.

Adjusted FG% is great, but what it doesn't tell you is that the Shaqs and Zach Randolphs are shooting in traffic all the time - so they are constantly being fouled, getting to the line, and getting more points.

Now, a stand-around jumpshooter like Walter McCarty, who takes two-thirds of his shots from three-point land, looks great on adjusted FG% because he hits 40% from behind the arc. But Walter never gets to the line and when he does, he shoots 65% or so.

Andre Miller, on the other hand, shoots about one three-pointer a game and is lousy at them, so on adjusted FG% he doesn't look all that hot. (He also shoots under 50% from the field) But in figuring Miller's performance, you have to take into account that he makes his living posting up other point guards; he gets about six free throws a game, and hits 85% of them. Three times a game, Miller takes a shot that isn't counted as a "field goal attempt", much less a make, but which nets him around 1.7 points.

Miller gets more points per shot attempt than Waltuh, but his adjusted FG% is lower. What we need to demonstrate this, is PSA. You calculate PSA as follows:

Total Points
--------------------------------------------------
Field Goal Attempts + (0.44 * Free Throw Attempts)

The reason for the 0.44 is that historically, each free throw attempt is equal to 0.44 possessions. You could use 0.5 if you wanted to, and the numbers would come out practically identical.

To use our two examples, McCarty had an adjusted FG% of .535, Miller of .470. But Miller has a PSA of 1.13, McCarty 1.10.

Aaron's Baseball Blog - Basketball (February 9, 2004)

Posted 10:05 a.m., February 10, 2004 (#34) - Craig B
  Second, again unlike baseball, defense accounts for half of the players value.

Is this true? What evidence do we have for this? My own instinct is that the existence of the shot clock makes offense more important. There is, in my view, some anecdotal evidence, particularly based on salary structure, that defense is not as important as offense. At the very least, offensive ability appears to be much more variable than defensive ability - meaning that in an analysis of the player pool, offensive ability has more "value" than defensive ability.

Furthermore, lots of teams have been able to have good defenses despite putting together teams full of garbage... last year's Nuggets were an excellent example.

The way basketball games are scored needs a major overhaul before the statistics become meaningful enough to start accurately rating players.

Well, what do you mean by "accurate"? It's certainly true that ratings aren't going to capture 100% of the facts about players. What we can do, though, is try to accurately represent what data we have - and it is rather a lot.

Aaron's Baseball Blog - Basketball (February 9, 2004)

Posted 11:01 a.m., February 10, 2004 (#39) - Craig B
  Russell comes out below Wilt and Robertson and Pettit and Baylor. But he was better than those guys because he could prevent the other team from scoring and he allowed his own team to get easy baskets.

Well, whether Russell was better than Wilt will get you a hell of an argument. I can't rightly say, as this was before my time, but it's hardly a foregone conclusion.

How can offense be more important than defense? Name one team that played mediocre defense that ever won the title?

I'm sorry, that's a stupid argument. Name one team that had a medicore offense that ever won the title. See? It doesn't tell you anything. Why the hell would a championship team ever be mediocre at anything?

You're also committing the player vs. team fallacy. Just because half of a team's success comes from defense, does not mean that half of the value of the players comes from defense.

Gervin was grotesquely overrated because you could not structure a consistent defense as long as he was on the floor.

Look, I'm not disagreeing with you. The stuff you are pointing to is all important. (It does, by the way, show up in team statistics).

What you're doing, though, is closing your eyes and screaming "YOU CAN'T RATE PLAYERS ON STATISTICS!!!!". That's not helpful. We *do* have a very good statistical record, that we can use to tell us about what goes on on the floor. Or we can choose to ignore it. Feel free to ignore it; but don't tell me that the car I'm building isn't any good because it doesn't fly. Deal with it on its own merits.

Aaron's Baseball Blog - Basketball (February 9, 2004)

Posted 1:36 p.m., February 11, 2004 (#63) - Craig B
  It's certainly a problem with the similarity scores method.

I don't think it's a problem with basketball statistics.

(Anyway, Dick Barnett's similarity with Russell came out at 845, that's not remotely similar. Dick Barnett has dozens of players more similar to him than Russell.)